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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The appellees (hereinafter referred to as "Welch") concur with the
appellants' (hereinafter referred to as "Giron") statement of jurisdiction.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue: Did the district court err when it granted Welch's motion for
summary judgment, holding "that there was no duty on the part of a signaling
driver, such as Welch, to the signaled driver, such as Noorbakhsh, or the
plaintiff in a fact situation very similar" to the Utah Supreme Court case of
Devine v. Cook, 3 Utah 2d 134, 279 P.2d 1073 (1955)?
Standard: The facts in the appeal at hand must give rise to a greater
legal duty on the part of Welch, the signalor driver, than that set forth in
Devine

; or, those facts must show that Welch failed to conform to the

standard of conduct required of the signalor driver as set forth in Devine, in
order for this court to reverse the trial court's judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

While it is true that the northbound traffic had backed up on Highland
Drive from 3300 South to approximately the 3350 South intersection, there is
nothing in the record to indicate that "rainy" conditions contributed to the
traffic backup or impaired anyone's vision. It is disputed whether Panter
Noorbakhsh (hereinafter referred to as "Noorbakhsh") was signaling to turn
left at the intersection where 3350 South intersects Highland Drive. (R-73) It
is also unknown, according to Noorbakhsh, how long she waited for a break in
the traffic. (R-122) It is undisputed, however, that after Welch in some manner
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signaled to Noorbakhsh, Noorbakhsh pulled out in front of Welch's vehicle,
came to a complete stop and looked to see if any cars were coming. (R-125)
She stated in her deposition, "I stopped in front of this car, the lady who gave
me the right-of-way. I looked, and I couldn't see any cars coming, and then I
came out a little bit more . . . ."

(R-125) Without question, Noorbakhsh was

in a position superior to Welch to observe traffic coming from behind and to
the left of Welch.
Welch brought the motion for summary judgment, not asserting that
they "had no duty to use reasonable care in signaling Giron", but rather that
the Devine case does not create a duty under these circumstances. The trial
court carefully applied the precedent set by this court and granted Welch's
motion for summary judgment.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Just as Giron totally relies on this court's decision in Devine v. Cook, 3
Utah 2d 134, 279 P.2d 1073 (1955), in their summary of argument, Welch urges
this court to apply the Devine case as the controlling precedent for the appeal
at hand. The Devine court, in a fact situation where the signalor driver would
have had a greater duty imposed upon him than Welch in the present appeal,
held as a matter of law that the signalor driver did not commit "any act of
negligence which caused or contributed to the cause of the accident." Devine
at 1082.
The existence of a duty must be determined only by the court. It is a
matter of law.

The trial court did not find facts reserved for jury

determination, but rather found that the circumstances at hand, based on
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incontroverted facts, did not create a legal obligation upon Welch.1 When the
signalor driver is not in a position to determine whether the signalee driver
can safely proceed or when the signalee driver has a better view of oncoming
traffic, the trial court should determine that the signalor driver is not liable as
a matter of law.

Both of those situations are present in this appeal.

Accordingly, the trial court's granting of Welch's motion for summary
judgment should be upheld.
ARGUMENT

POINT I:

BEFORE NEGLIGENCE QUESTIONS CAN BE SUBMITTED TO A
JURY, THE TRIAL COURT MUST DETERMINE WHETHER THE
LAW IMPOSES ANY LEGAL DUTY UPON THE DEFENDANT

Under the facts in Devine, the Utah Supreme Court determined, as a
matter of law, that signaling another driver to proceed was not an act of
negligence. In that case, the lawsuit had been tried to a jury. Apparently, at
the conclusion of the evidence, the signalor driver moved for a directed
verdict. That motion was not granted and on appeal, the Supreme Court
concluded that the trial court committed error in refusing to do so.
The error committed by the trial court in Devine was that it failed in
fulfilling its obligation to first determine whether, upon the facts and
evidence, such a relation exists between the parties that a legal obligation
would be imposed upon the defendant before allowing a jury to determine
factual questions.
This is entirely a question of law, to be determined by
reference to the body of statutes, rules, principles and
lf

rhe findings of facts entered by the trial court are based on uncontested facts also cited by Giron in their brief.
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precedents which make up the law; and it must be
determined only by the court.
W. Prosser & W. Keeton,

PROSSER

& KEATON on

TORTS,

§37 (W. Keeton, D.

Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen 5th ed. 1984).
A trial court is also charged with the obligation to remove the issue from
the jury when the actions of the defendant clearly have conformed with the
standard of conduct set forth by the court and where no reasonable jury could
reach a contrary conclusion. That determination typically takes the form of
granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment or directed verdict. Id.
See also, Management Comm. v. Gray stone Pines, Inc., 652 P. 2d 896 (Utah
1982). The Restatement (Second) of Torts outlined the functions of the court
in §328 B as follows:
In an action for negligence the court determines
(a) whether the evidence as to the facts makes an
issue upon which the jury may reasonably find the
existence or non-existence of such facts;
(b) whether such facts give rise to any legal duty on
the part of the defendant;
(c) the standard of conduct required of the
defendant by his legal duty;
(d) whether the defendant has conformed to that
standard, in any case in which the jury may not
reasonably come to a different conclusion;
(e) the applicability of any rules of law determining
whether the defendant's conduct is of legal cause of
harm to the plaintiff; and
(f) whether the harm claimed to be suffered by the
plaintiff is legally compensable.
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When the trial court was presented with Welch's motion for summary
judgment, it was required to fulfill its obligations as set forth above and apply
the only precedent in this jurisdiction to the facts at hand. It is clear from the
court's conclusions of law and Judge Young's comments at the hearing on
Welch's motion for summary judgment, that the trial court "closely examinefd]
the circumstances surrounding the alleged negligent signal and expressly
reject[ed] a blanket rule that signaling drivers could never be held liable for
injuries resulting from their actions."

POINT H:

THE FACTS IN THE APPEAL AT HAND IMPOSE LESS
OF A LEGAL OBLIGATION UPON WELCH THAN THE
FACTS IN DEVBVE

All parties agree that the precedent to be followed in the present appeal
is this court's decision in Devine.

Giron has not urged this court to depart

from its ruling in Devine, overturn that case and accept the reasoning of other
jurisdictions. Accordingly, if this court is persuaded that the facts in the
Giron appeal would give rise to a lesser or equal legal duty on the part of
Welch than the duty set forth in Devine

or show that Welch equally

conformed to the standard of conduct required of a signalor driver as set forth
in Devine, it must affirm the trial court's judgment.
On page 9 of Giron's brief, Giron correctly pointed out that Devine
"stands for the principle" that trial courts should grant motions for summary
judgment and directed verdict
. . . when both the signaling and signalee drivers have an
adequate view of the surrounding dangers, or when the
signalee driver has a better view.
Under such
5

circumstances, a s a matter of law it is unreasonable to
a s s u m e t h a t the signaling driver was doing anything
more than yielding the right-of-way, because both drivers
were undoubtedly aware t h a t the signalee had as good a
view, or better yet, a superior view of the surrounding
dangers, and could t h u s judge the risks accordingly.
A close examination of the events surrounding and the locations of the
Giron and Devine

accidents clearly shows that the signalor driver in the

Giron appeal would have less of a legal duty to "protect" the plaintiff than the
signalor driver in the Devine
A.

case.

Intersections.
The accident in Devine

occurred at the intersection of 1500 South in

Bountiful, Utah, and US Highway 9 1 . 1500 South, a two-lane street, runs east
and west and crosses US Highway 9 1 , a four-lane street running north and
south. The speed limit in that immediate area for northbound traffic was 40
miles per hour. There were no visual obstructions other than vehicular traffic.
Devine at 1074.
The intersection where the Noorbakhsh and Giron vehicles collided is
off-set somewhat.

Highland Drive is a four-lane street running north and

south intersected by 3350 South Street to the east and 3330 South Street to
the west.

3350 South Street is a two-lane street running east and west,

slightly angled to the north.

The speed limit in the immediate area for

northbound traffic was 40 miles per hour. There were no visual obstructions
other than vehicular traffic.
B.

Signalor Drivers.
In Devine , the signalor driver was operating a tank truck and pulling a

four-wheel trailer owned and operated by W. S. Hatch Company, Inc. The tank
6

truck was being closely followed by a tractor transporting a two-wheel semitrailer also owned by the Hatch Company. The large trucks and trailers were
proceeding northbound on US Highway 91 on the inside lane and desired to
make a left-hand turn onto 1500 South. The trucks could not complete that
left-hand turn because of the narrowness of 1500 South and the fact that the
signalee driver was stopped at a stop sign in the right-hand lane of that
intersection, eastbound on 1500 South. Devineat 1074.
Both trucks came to a complete stop at the intersection. The first truck
indicated that he intended to make a left-hand turn and then, in some
manner, signaled for the signalee driver to proceed into the intersection. The
signalor driver knew that he was being followed by another large tractor and
trailer. He knew that the signalee driver's view would be blocked by the two
large vehicles owned by the Hatch Company. He knew of the plaintiffs vehicle
because he had recently passed it. Id. His view of northbound traffic was
limited to the use of his rearview mirrors. The purpose for signaling the
signalee driver to proceed was to assist the Hatch trucks in making their lefthand turns. The signalor driver had the right-of-way to make a left-hand turn
once any southbound traffic had cleared.
In the instant case, Welch was proceeding northbound in the outside
lane of Highland Drive in heavy traffic.

The traffic had backed up to

approximately 3350 South from 3300 South. She was driving a Buick Skylark.
Out of courtesy and in an effort to avoid blocking the intersection in violation
of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-109.10 (1988 Replacement), she left space for
Noorbakhsh, the signalee driver, to enter the intersection. (R-73) Noorbakhsh
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was westbound on 3350 South and stopped at a stop sign. Welch had the
right-of-way and was intending on proceeding straight ahead when traffic
would permit. She gained no advantage in the traffic by yielding her right-ofway to Noorbakhsh. Welch's view of northbound traffic from behind her and
to her left was limited to looking over her left shoulder or in her rearview
mirrors. Finally, it was obvious to Welch that Noorbakhsh was looking for
oncoming traffic when she pulled forward and came to a complete stop in front
of Welch's vehicle.
C.

Signalee Drivers.
The Hatch trucks were higher, longer and wider than Welch's Buick

Skylark. There can be little doubt that the signalee driver's view of oncoming
traffic in Devine was impaired to a greater extent than the view Noorbakhsh
had either when stopped for the stop sign or, more particularly, after she had
proceeded out into the inside lane of the northbound traffic.

It is undisputed

that Noorbakhsh pulled out into the intersection and in front of Welch to look
for oncoming traffic and determine for herself whether it was safe to proceed.
D.

Plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs in both cases were northbound in travel lanes adjacent to

the signalor drivers. Again in the Devine

case, the plaintiffs view of traffic

stopped at the accident intersection would have been more greatly impaired by
the two large trucks and trailers than the Buick Skylark.

Additionally,

Giron's caution should have been heightened by the fact that she was
proceeding in heavy traffic and that it was obvious that traffic had built up
from the stop light at 3300 South and Highland Drive.
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CONCLUSION
Giron attempts to cloud the simple and straightforward issue presented
for determination by this court.

Without question, the trial court h a s the

obligation of determining whether a legal duty exists under the specific
factual setting in the case at hand. In this appeal, there is only one appellate
decision which h a s precedential value. In comparing the Giron appeal and the
Devine

case, it is clear that Welch would have had less of a legal obligation

than, or at least the same as, the signalor driver in Devine.

Accordingly, the

judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of July, 1991.
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